The importance of clientelism and informal practices for employment among political party members after the 2000s in Serbia - an explorative enquiry

In the paper, we focus on one particular segment of informal practices within political parties and that is how the issue of employment in the public sector structures informal networks and actions within political parties. We consider this mechanism as crucial for influencing the dynamics of everyday political functioning in Serbia. Taking into account the unemployment rate in Serbia and the belated and slow development of the private sector, which cannot absorb the labor force, employment in the public sector is considered to be an important resource. We will explore how political players create their strategies in order to satisfy personal or collective interest, specifically, employment in the public sector, “navigating between formal rules and informal norms” (Ledeneva, 2001: 15). First, this article addresses the use and dominance of informal networks, clientelism, and patronage in the political sphere (specifically, political parties) within the post-socialist Serbian development of a democratic system. Second, we present models and mechanisms of informal institutions, networks, and rules in political parties that are important for the employment of party members in public administration. Third, we analyze the normative framework which follows these informal institutions and enables their creation and reproduction