The Leaky Web: Automated Discovery of Cross-Site Information Leaks in Browsers and the Web

When browsing the web, none of us want sites to infer which other sites we may have visited before or are logged in to. However, attacker-controlled sites may infer this state through browser side-channels dubbed Cross-Site Leaks (XS-Leaks). Although these issues have been known since the 2000s, prior reports mostly found individual instances of issues rather than systematically studying the problem space. Further, actual impact in the wild often remained opaque. To address these open problems, we develop the first automated framework to systematically discover observation channels in browsers. In doing so, we detect and characterize 280 observation channels that leak information cross-site in the engines of Chromium, Firefox, and Safari, which include many variations of supposedly fixed leaks. Atop this framework, we create an automatic pipeline to find XS-Leaks in real-world websites. With this pipeline, we conduct the largest to-date study on XS-Leak prevalence in the wild by performing visit inference and a newly proposed variant cookie acceptance inference attack on the Tranco Top10K. In addition, we test 100 websites for the classic XS-Leak attack vector of login detection. Our results show that XS-Leaks pose a significant threat to the web ecosystem as at least 15%, 34%, and 77% of all tested sites are vulnerable to the three attacks. Also, we present substantial implementation differences between the browsers resulting in differing attack surfaces that matter in the wild. To ensure browser vendors and web developers alike can check their applications for XS-Leaks, we open-source our framework and include an extensive discussion on countermeasures to get rid of XS-Leaks in the near future and ensure new features in browsers do not introduce new XS-Leaks