We revisit the debate on Cournot and Bertrand profit comparison in a vertically related upstream market for inputs. We find that when an input pricing contract is determined through centralised bargaining, the final goods producers earn higher (lower) profit under quantity competition than under price competition if the goods are substitutes (complements). Our results are strikingly different to the ones obtained from a similar comparison in other vertical pricing models
This paper deals with the issue of the Cournot–Bertrand profit differential by bringing together two...
In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014, Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related ma...
Häckner (2000) shows that in a differentiated oligopoly with more than two firms , prices may be hig...
We revisit the debate on Cournot and Bertrand profit comparison in a vertically related upstream mar...
We consider a vertically related market where one quantity setting and another price setting downstr...
We re-investigate the endogenous choice of price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot) contract in the p...
We consider a vertically related market where one quantity setting and another price setting downstr...
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which ...
We investigate the endogenous choice of strategic variable (a price or a quantity) by downstream fir...
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which ...
In a vertically related duopoly with input price bargaining, this paper re-examines the downstream f...
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which ...
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute good...
We study whether a quantity or a price contract is chosen at equilibrium by one integrated firm and ...
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed comparison of two types of oligopolistic com...
This paper deals with the issue of the Cournot–Bertrand profit differential by bringing together two...
In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014, Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related ma...
Häckner (2000) shows that in a differentiated oligopoly with more than two firms , prices may be hig...
We revisit the debate on Cournot and Bertrand profit comparison in a vertically related upstream mar...
We consider a vertically related market where one quantity setting and another price setting downstr...
We re-investigate the endogenous choice of price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot) contract in the p...
We consider a vertically related market where one quantity setting and another price setting downstr...
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which ...
We investigate the endogenous choice of strategic variable (a price or a quantity) by downstream fir...
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which ...
In a vertically related duopoly with input price bargaining, this paper re-examines the downstream f...
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which ...
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute good...
We study whether a quantity or a price contract is chosen at equilibrium by one integrated firm and ...
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed comparison of two types of oligopolistic com...
This paper deals with the issue of the Cournot–Bertrand profit differential by bringing together two...
In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014, Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related ma...
Häckner (2000) shows that in a differentiated oligopoly with more than two firms , prices may be hig...
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