On Spectrum Selection Games in Cognitive Radio Networks

Cognitive Radio Networks aim at enhancing spectrum utilization by allowing cognitive devices to opportunistically access vast portions of the spectrum. To reach such ambitious goal, cognitive terminals must be geared with enhanced spectrum management capabilities including the detection of unused spectrum holes (spectrum sensing), the characterization of available bands (spectrum decision), the coordination with other cognitive devices in the access phase (spectrum sharing), and the capability to handover towards other spectrum holes when licensed users kick in or if a better spectrum opportunity becomes available (spectrum mobility). In this paper, a game theoretic framework is proposed to evaluate spectrum management functionalities in Cognitive Radio Networks. The spectrum selection process is cast as a non-cooperative game among secondary users who can opportunistically select the “best” spectrum opportunity, under the tight constraint not to harm primary licensed users. Different quality measures for the spectrum opportunities are considered and evaluated in the game framework, including the spectrum bandwidth, and the spectrum opportunity holding time. The cost of spectrum mobility is also accounted in the analytical framework. Numerical results are reported to assess the quality of the game equilibria