We study a two-period entry model where the incumbent, privately informed about his cost of production, makes a long run investment choice along with a pricing decision. Investment is costreducing and its effects are assumed to differ across incumbent’s types, as a result investment plays a double role as a commitment variable and, along with price, as a signal. We ask whether and how investment decisions allow the incumbent to limit entry into the market. We find that the incumbent will never undertake strategic investment to deter profitable entry, because when incumbent’s costs are private information the signaling role of investment cancels out its value of commitmen
Advertising is commonly regarded as a strategic tool to increase demand and steal business from comp...
This paper is the first to provide a general context whereby potential entry can lead incumbent firm...
This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless sign...
We study a two-period entry model where the incumbent, privately informed about his cost of product...
We study a two-period entry model where the incumbent, privately informed about his cost of produ...
We study an entry model where an incumbent privately informed about costs can make a cost-reducing i...
The commitment value of unobservable investment with cost-reducing effects is examined in an entry ...
We study a standard entry game where the incumbent makes a long runinvestment choice and a pricing d...
We study a two periods entry game where the incumbent rm, who has private information about his own...
This paper considers a long-standing question in the field of Industrial Organization: Can an incumb...
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we analyze an infinite horizon entry model where an incumbent ...
Huberts NFD, Dawid H, Huisman K, Kort PM. Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a...
Both through empirical research and laboratory experiments it has been shown that managers are heter...
AbstractThe paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We find that und...
Advertising is commonly regarded as a strategic tool to increase demand and steal business from comp...
This paper is the first to provide a general context whereby potential entry can lead incumbent firm...
This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless sign...
We study a two-period entry model where the incumbent, privately informed about his cost of product...
We study a two-period entry model where the incumbent, privately informed about his cost of produ...
We study an entry model where an incumbent privately informed about costs can make a cost-reducing i...
The commitment value of unobservable investment with cost-reducing effects is examined in an entry ...
We study a standard entry game where the incumbent makes a long runinvestment choice and a pricing d...
We study a two periods entry game where the incumbent rm, who has private information about his own...
This paper considers a long-standing question in the field of Industrial Organization: Can an incumb...
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we analyze an infinite horizon entry model where an incumbent ...
Huberts NFD, Dawid H, Huisman K, Kort PM. Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a...
Both through empirical research and laboratory experiments it has been shown that managers are heter...
AbstractThe paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We find that und...
Advertising is commonly regarded as a strategic tool to increase demand and steal business from comp...
This paper is the first to provide a general context whereby potential entry can lead incumbent firm...
This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless sign...