Add to ORKGRegularization methods in Stackelberg games are presented, first concerning follower reaction sets, then concerning follower payoff
International audienceRegularized learning is a fundamental technique in online optimization, machin...
Two-player Stackelberg games may have multiple Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (henceforth SPNEs), e...
Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weig...
Regularization methods in Stackelberg games are presented, first concerning follower reaction sets, ...
In a two-stage Stackelberg game, depending on the leader’s information about the choice of the follo...
In a two-stage Stackelberg game, depending on the leader’s information about the choice of the follo...
34 pages, 6 figuresInternational audienceWe investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics i...
International audienceIn this paper, we examine the convergence rate of a wide range of regularized ...
In this chapter we consider a two-stage game with one leader and one (or more) followers and we inve...
In this chapter we consider a two-stage game with one leader and one (or more) followers and we inve...
Abstract. We investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics in which each player plays a “re...
Games are considered in which the role of the players is a hierarchical one. Some players behave as ...
© The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract Games ...
The hierarchical interaction between the actor and critic in actor-critic based reinforcement learni...
Abstract. We investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics in which each player plays a “re...
International audienceRegularized learning is a fundamental technique in online optimization, machin...
Two-player Stackelberg games may have multiple Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (henceforth SPNEs), e...
Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weig...
Regularization methods in Stackelberg games are presented, first concerning follower reaction sets, ...
In a two-stage Stackelberg game, depending on the leader’s information about the choice of the follo...
In a two-stage Stackelberg game, depending on the leader’s information about the choice of the follo...
34 pages, 6 figuresInternational audienceWe investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics i...
International audienceIn this paper, we examine the convergence rate of a wide range of regularized ...
In this chapter we consider a two-stage game with one leader and one (or more) followers and we inve...
In this chapter we consider a two-stage game with one leader and one (or more) followers and we inve...
Abstract. We investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics in which each player plays a “re...
Games are considered in which the role of the players is a hierarchical one. Some players behave as ...
© The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract Games ...
The hierarchical interaction between the actor and critic in actor-critic based reinforcement learni...
Abstract. We investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics in which each player plays a “re...
International audienceRegularized learning is a fundamental technique in online optimization, machin...
Two-player Stackelberg games may have multiple Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (henceforth SPNEs), e...
Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weig...