Central Banking After The Financial Crisis

In my dissertation I examine the policies adopted by central banks, and inflation outcomes, in Japan, the Euro Area, the United Kingdom, and United States compared to the degree of independence of each central bank as well as the career backgrounds of individual central bankers, to see if either independence or career experience are effective explanations of inflation outcomes and central bank policy during the period of low inflation between 2008 and 2019. The ideas that central bank independence and the career experiences of individual central bankers can explain central bank policy were both developed based on analyses during periods when high inflation was the principal problem that central banks faced. While there is substantial research that supports both independence and career experience as factors that explain central bank performance and inflation outcomes when the risk of high inflation is the primary challenge to central banking, I find that when disinflation or deflation is the principal problem central banks face, independence and career experience are not sufficient explanations of central bank policy making and inflation outcomes