Optimal Scoring Rules for Multi-dimensional Effort

This paper develops a framework for the design of scoring rules to optimally incentivize an agent to exert a multi-dimensional effort. This framework is a generalization to strategic agents of the classical knapsack problem (cf. Briest, Krysta, and V\"ocking, 2005, Singer, 2010) and it is foundational to applying algorithmic mechanism design to the classroom. The paper identifies two simple families of scoring rules that guarantee constant approximations to the optimal scoring rule. The truncated separate scoring rule is the sum of single dimensional scoring rules that is truncated to the bounded range of feasible scores. The threshold scoring rule gives the maximum score if reports exceed a threshold and zero otherwise. Approximate optimality of one or the other of these rules is similar to the bundling or selling separately result of Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier, and Weinberg (2014). Finally, we show that the approximate optimality of the best of those two simple scoring rules is robust when the agent's choice of effort is made sequentially