Interlocking complementarities between job design and labour contracts

In this paper, we study the existence of interlocking complementarities between job design and labour contract at the firm level. Using a formal model, we show that firms face two organizational equilibria: one in which job designs with high routine task intensity are matched with a large use of non-standard contracts; and the other in which low routine task intensity combines with a small use of non-standard contracts. These complementarities exist because while non-standard contracts allow firm to adjust to external shocks, they also provide little incentive to invest in firm-specific knowledge. We test this prediction using linked-employer-employee data from the Emilia-Romagna region. The evidence is consistent with our theory: the use of nonstandard contracts is positively associated with routine task intensity at the firm level. This result holds controlling for a wide range of firm-specific and contextual covariates and it is robust to alternative estimation methods (OLS, panel and IV)