Epistemology

This chapter focuses on some of the most discussed issues of contemporary epistemology. It is divided into four main sections, each devoted to a particular problem. More precisely: (i) the analysis of the notion of knowledge; (ii) the role of epistemic justification and its theories; (iii) the problem of skepticism about the external world; (iv) epistemic relativism. (i) First of all, propositional knowledge is distinguished from two other kinds of knowledge that fall outside the scope of the traditional analysis (that is, knowledge by acquaintance and procedural knowledge) and the definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) is introduced. Hence, the necessity of all three conditions is illustrated and defended. Finally, the Gettier problem is presented through two relevant counterexamples to the JTB analysis and then some general strategies to rebut the objection by searching for a suitable further condition able to \u201cdegettierize\u201d JTB are discussed (Gettier 1963, Lehrer 1965, Lehrer e Paxson 1969, Armstrong 1973, Swain 1974, Nozick 1981). (ii) In the second part, the principal theories of justification are examined and the differences between epistemic internalism and externalism clarified. To begin, foundationalism and coherentism are introduced as two possible answers to the regress problem: according to the former, justification chains end in a non-arbitrary way when they encounter a basic belief, while the latter argues that justification is a holistic notion. Then, a more recent theory of justification is analyzed, that is process reliabilism, according to which the justification of a belief depends on the reliability of the cognitive process that has actually produced it (Goldman 1979, 1986). To conclude, Sosa\u2019s version of virtue epistemology is presented as a possible solution to the value problem for knowledge (Sosa 1991, 2007, 2009). (iii) As a third point, the traditional problem of skepticism about the external world is examined: this skepticism does not deny the existence of the external world but affirms that we cannot know that there is such a world. Two different externalist answers are proposed: according to the first one, the skeptical argument can be rebutted by simply recognizing the fact that our senses are reliable sources of knowledge; alternatively, the second externalist proposal denies the principle of epistemic closure: if S knows that p, and S knows that p implies q, then S knows that q (Dretske 1970, 2005, Nozick 1981). A different possibility is also investigated, that is contextualism: the basic idea is that the verb \u201cto know\u201d, like some adjectives such as \u201cflat\u201d, is sensitive to the context (Cohen 1986, DeRose 1992, 1995). A fourth alternative, which is based on the notion of entitlement, that is of a non-evidential or a default justification, is finally suggested (Wright 2004). (iv) The last section is dedicated to epistemic relativism. The first kind of relativism which has been analyzed and criticized is that about knowledge attributions, as it has been upheld by MacFarlane: its main thesis is that knowledge attributions do not vary with respect to the context of use but to the context of assessment (MacFarlane 2005b). The second one is relativism about justification, according to which what justifies a belief constitutively depends on the particular methods, theories, and principles one assumes (Kuhn 1962, Feyerabend 1975)