Normative Inconsistency and Logical Theories: A First Critique of Defeasibilism

According to many defenders of defeasible deontic logics, their systems provide an explanation of how conflicting norms are commonly processed, which standard deontic logic cannot offer because of its very nature. This is supposedly so for standard deontic logic is taken either (a) to rule out the very possibility of normative conflicts by validating the sentence \u201c 3c(Oa & O 3ca)\u201d, or (b) not to be able to offer any solution to normative conflicts. Against this twofold view, I argue, on the one hand, that standard systems of deontic logic are well capable of accounting for normative conflicts, by using the basic distinction between norms and propositions about norms. On the other hand, I argue that defeasibilist attempts to dealing with antinomies are in need of clarification: in fact, (1) on their descriptive reading, it is not clear in which stage of normative reasoning they locate conflict-solving activities; (2) on their normative reading, in turn, defeasibilist proposals of conflict-processing do not seem to be very promising, for they are either reducible to deductivist approaches or are not able to solve normative inconsistencies