Do We Know (almost) Nothing? Global Scepticism and Justification

According to the minimal version of the traditional analysis of knowledge, there are (at least) three necessary components to knowledge, that is, justified and true belief. In this paper we will argue that even in a global sceptical scenario, all three conditions minimally necessary for knowledge can be satisfied. In particular, we will focus on the justification requirement and analyse two \u201ctraditional\u201d theories of justification, i.e., coherentism and foundationalism, as well as a more \u201cinnovative\u201d one, i.e., reliabilism. Then, we will conclude that if we want to continue claiming that, in a global sceptical scenario, a cognitive subject does not know (almost) anything, we should recognise that she may still have justified true beliefs, and we should, therefore, look elsewhere for the reasons she lacks knowledge