Also published as Working Paper DFAEII 2003-03In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation on whether to remain independent as an external patentee or to merge with a manufacturing firm, becoming an internal to the industry patentee. We show that a merger is profitable only for the case of small innovations whereas only large innovations make it welfare improving. As a consequence, the antitrust authority should forbid all (profitable) mergers.Financial support from BEC 2000/0301, UPV HB 8238/2000, 9/UPV 00035.321-13560/2001 (Sandonís) and BEC 2001/0535, GV01-391 and the IVIE (Faulí-Oller) is gratefully acknowledged
Few empirical studies have addressed the impact of the patent system on industry structure. Using fi...
The aim of this note is to study the optimal licensing of a non drastic cost reducing patented innov...
We analyze merger policy in an industry where firms participate in a non-tournament R&D competition....
In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a patented process inno...
An independent research laboratory owns a patented process innovation that can be licensed by means ...
An extensive literature has investigated the effect of market structure on innovation. A persistent ...
Obtaining a patent provides the patentee with the ability to offer a potential entrant a license to ...
Patent pools of complementary technologies are known to contribute to social welfare by reducing the...
Fundamental innovation usually involves huge upfront costs, but the benefits are spread across vario...
We study the licensing incentives of an independent input producer owning a patented product innovat...
This paper explores the extend to which patent licensing can internalize the externalities in patent...
Does vertical integration of an input innovator with a downstream firm entail innovation foreclosure...
The “monopoly” authorized by the Patent Act refers to the exclusionary power of individual patents. ...
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from INFORMS via the DOI in t...
Patents create strong incentives for collaborative development. For many technologies fixed costs ar...
Few empirical studies have addressed the impact of the patent system on industry structure. Using fi...
The aim of this note is to study the optimal licensing of a non drastic cost reducing patented innov...
We analyze merger policy in an industry where firms participate in a non-tournament R&D competition....
In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a patented process inno...
An independent research laboratory owns a patented process innovation that can be licensed by means ...
An extensive literature has investigated the effect of market structure on innovation. A persistent ...
Obtaining a patent provides the patentee with the ability to offer a potential entrant a license to ...
Patent pools of complementary technologies are known to contribute to social welfare by reducing the...
Fundamental innovation usually involves huge upfront costs, but the benefits are spread across vario...
We study the licensing incentives of an independent input producer owning a patented product innovat...
This paper explores the extend to which patent licensing can internalize the externalities in patent...
Does vertical integration of an input innovator with a downstream firm entail innovation foreclosure...
The “monopoly” authorized by the Patent Act refers to the exclusionary power of individual patents. ...
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from INFORMS via the DOI in t...
Patents create strong incentives for collaborative development. For many technologies fixed costs ar...
Few empirical studies have addressed the impact of the patent system on industry structure. Using fi...
The aim of this note is to study the optimal licensing of a non drastic cost reducing patented innov...
We analyze merger policy in an industry where firms participate in a non-tournament R&D competition....