Politica monetaria e lotta per il potere: le teorie del ciclo polico-economico

The article reviews the various models of the political-monetary cycles proposed both by Economists and Political Scientists. These models (all centered on the Phillips curve) are examined in particular by focussing on the ways in which they characterise the political demand and supply sides: the theory of Political Business Cycles, based on the assumption of an opportunistic attitude of government elites; the Partisan Theory, which stresses the relevance of ideological factors for the choices of government parties; the Rational Expectations Theory, which promotes \u2013 against the Keynesian and Neo-keynesian perspectives \u2013 money neutrality, and stresses the temptation to exploit the \u201cinflationist surprise\u201d. After having sketched these approaches, the article puts forward some criticisms. First, these theories are based on a simplified vision of political exchange, which ignores the creative elements that characterize the \u201cpolitical entrepreneur\u201d and his or her manifestoes, and leads to an underscoring of the (at least partially) endogenous character of political demands. In effect, leaders and parties seek to achieve a selective and sufficiently large support, rather than to maximise a generalised support, by artificially creating a \u201csocial block\u201d (a coalition of disparate interests and groups), and by supplying it with an ideological basis. Second, these theories adopt a vision of society as a whole that obscures the heterogeneity of social groups and interests, and their conflicting aims. Third, political demand and supply are continuously modified by changing international and domestic scenarios; and these changes reduce the possibilities of repeated and predictable cycles driven by politics. Fourth, the style of analysis is process oriented, and the impact of structures and institutions is neglected. As a result of these shortcomings, nearly all the models are induced to overestimate the positive value of the monetary policies, and consequently to give little place to much more flexible and selective fiscal policies. Furthermore, the neglect of the redistributive effects of monetary and financial instability leads to an underestimation of the consequences of this instability in terms of negative political effects. The economic and social importance of money dramatically manifests itself in phases of instability and disorder: and the emergence of independent central banks is to be understood also as a means of preserving the political order against the potentially disruptive effects of the political and electoral markets