Add to ORKGWe use simplicial complexes to model weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered unlikely or impossible. Expressions for Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for such games in terms of the topology of simplicial complexes are provided. We calculate the indices in several examples of weighted voting games with unfeasible coalitions, including the U.S. Electoral College and the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina.Comment: 23 pages, 5 figures, 4 table
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
(3, 2)-Simple games are a model for voting situation in which players can vote not only in favour or...
Power indices in simple games measure the relevance of a player through her ability in being critica...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
The Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and other voting power indices measure the importance of a p...
Coalitions of weighted voting games can be restricted to be connected components of a graph. As a co...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
The Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and other voting power indices measure the importance of a p...
We introduce a new generating function based method to compute the Banzhaf, Deegan? Packel, Public ...
We generalize the notion of power index for simple games to different orders of criticality, where t...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity...
Abstract. In cooperative game theory, various kinds of power indexes are used to measure the influen...
Abstract In TU-games in characteristic function form, some power indices can be expressed by means o...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
(3, 2)-Simple games are a model for voting situation in which players can vote not only in favour or...
Power indices in simple games measure the relevance of a player through her ability in being critica...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
The Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and other voting power indices measure the importance of a p...
Coalitions of weighted voting games can be restricted to be connected components of a graph. As a co...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
The Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and other voting power indices measure the importance of a p...
We introduce a new generating function based method to compute the Banzhaf, Deegan? Packel, Public ...
We generalize the notion of power index for simple games to different orders of criticality, where t...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity...
Abstract. In cooperative game theory, various kinds of power indexes are used to measure the influen...
Abstract In TU-games in characteristic function form, some power indices can be expressed by means o...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
(3, 2)-Simple games are a model for voting situation in which players can vote not only in favour or...
Power indices in simple games measure the relevance of a player through her ability in being critica...