We establish nonparametric identification of auction models with continuous and nonseparable unobserved heterogeneity using three consecutive order statistics of bids. We then propose sieve maximum likelihood estimators for the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and the private value, as well as their conditional and marginal distributions. Lastly, we apply our methodology to a novel dataset from judicial auctions in China. Our estimates suggest substantial gains from accounting for unobserved heterogeneity when setting reserve prices. We propose a simple scheme that achieves nearly optimal revenue by using the appraisal value as the reserve price
Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders’ val- uation distributions are known to the auctio...
We propose a quantile-based nonparametric approach to inference on the probability density function ...
This paper proposes a semiparametric estimation procedure of the first-price auc-tion model with ris...
A common concern in the empirical study of auctions is the likely presence of auction-specific facto...
We consider nonparametric identification of independent private value first-price auction models, in...
This paper empirically studies the consequences of unobserved heterogeneity on auction design. Unobs...
We propose a novel methodology for identification of first-price auctions, when bidders’ private val...
We propose a novel methodology for identification of first-price auctions, when bidders’ private val...
to be non-separable from bidders ’ valuations. Our central identifying assumption is that the distri...
In a classical model of the first-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values, we devel...
This paper proposes a semiparametric estimation procedure of the first-price auction model with risk...
Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price an...
The accurate assessment of participants’ private information may critically affect policy recommenda...
A wide variety of auction models exhibit close relationships between the winner's expected profit an...
In a common values environment, some market participants have private information relevant to othe...
Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders’ val- uation distributions are known to the auctio...
We propose a quantile-based nonparametric approach to inference on the probability density function ...
This paper proposes a semiparametric estimation procedure of the first-price auc-tion model with ris...
A common concern in the empirical study of auctions is the likely presence of auction-specific facto...
We consider nonparametric identification of independent private value first-price auction models, in...
This paper empirically studies the consequences of unobserved heterogeneity on auction design. Unobs...
We propose a novel methodology for identification of first-price auctions, when bidders’ private val...
We propose a novel methodology for identification of first-price auctions, when bidders’ private val...
to be non-separable from bidders ’ valuations. Our central identifying assumption is that the distri...
In a classical model of the first-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values, we devel...
This paper proposes a semiparametric estimation procedure of the first-price auction model with risk...
Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price an...
The accurate assessment of participants’ private information may critically affect policy recommenda...
A wide variety of auction models exhibit close relationships between the winner's expected profit an...
In a common values environment, some market participants have private information relevant to othe...
Auction theory traditionally assumes that bidders’ val- uation distributions are known to the auctio...
We propose a quantile-based nonparametric approach to inference on the probability density function ...
This paper proposes a semiparametric estimation procedure of the first-price auc-tion model with ris...