This paper reports a study on decision-making by borrowers regarding take-up of different loan types in a laboratory microfinance experiment. I show that when prospective borrowers are offered a flexible choice of different loan types (here, individual liability (IL) and joint liability (JL)), take-up increases. This is due to heterogeneous borrowers self-selecting into different loan types. Results suggest that more risk averse borrowers are less willing to take up IL loan and less selfish borrowers show signs of higher inclination to take up JL loan. The results collectively imply that microloan offers need to be customized according to the heterogeneous preferences of borrowers; also, there needs to be enough flexibil...
This thesis aims to compare loan repayment decisions under individual and joint liability lending s...
This note argues that the joint liability contracting equilibria worked out in Ghatak(2000) have a s...
In this paper we consider that a representative of a not so affluent rural household has three optio...
Joint-liability is maybe the most distinctive feature of microfinance contracts in developing countr...
We design an artefactual field experiment to study the relationship between joint- liability lending...
We gratefully acknowledge the research grant by Knowledge to Action (Registered Charity No. 1167408)...
We study, theoretically and empirically, the effort choices of microfinance borrowers under individu...
We study, theoretically and empirically, the effort choices of microfinance borrowers under individu...
Peer-group mechanisms have been widely used by micro-credit institutions to minimize default risk. H...
Joint-liability is maybe the most distinctive feature of microfinance contracts in developing countr...
This paper contrasts individual liability lending with and without groups to joint liability lending...
I compare welfare generated by a credit contract with individual liability and a contract with joint...
In this paper we want to do a comparative impact evaluation among the participants of two separate t...
Various theories make predictions about the relative advantages of individual loans versus joint lia...
This thesis aims to compare loan repayment decisions under individual and joint liability lending s...
This note argues that the joint liability contracting equilibria worked out in Ghatak(2000) have a s...
In this paper we consider that a representative of a not so affluent rural household has three optio...
Joint-liability is maybe the most distinctive feature of microfinance contracts in developing countr...
We design an artefactual field experiment to study the relationship between joint- liability lending...
We gratefully acknowledge the research grant by Knowledge to Action (Registered Charity No. 1167408)...
We study, theoretically and empirically, the effort choices of microfinance borrowers under individu...
We study, theoretically and empirically, the effort choices of microfinance borrowers under individu...
Peer-group mechanisms have been widely used by micro-credit institutions to minimize default risk. H...
Joint-liability is maybe the most distinctive feature of microfinance contracts in developing countr...
This paper contrasts individual liability lending with and without groups to joint liability lending...
I compare welfare generated by a credit contract with individual liability and a contract with joint...
In this paper we want to do a comparative impact evaluation among the participants of two separate t...
Various theories make predictions about the relative advantages of individual loans versus joint lia...
This thesis aims to compare loan repayment decisions under individual and joint liability lending s...
This note argues that the joint liability contracting equilibria worked out in Ghatak(2000) have a s...
In this paper we consider that a representative of a not so affluent rural household has three optio...