Jus Ad Vim: Military Institutions and Legitimate Authority

In 2006, Michael Walzer suggested that there was a need to improve our moral judgments in relation to the use of military force short-of-war. He argued that just war theory should seek to develop the notion of jus ad vim because there is an “urgent need for a theory of just and unjust uses of force outside the conditions of war.” In her 2016 response to Daniel Brunstetter’s conception of jus ad vim, Helen Frowe argues that the notion is irrelevant because she believes there is nothing morally special about the condition of war. She says that a “theory” of jus ad vim adds nothing to the conventional understanding of just war proportionality. In this paper, I examine both Brunstetter’s conception of jus ad vim and Frowe’s critique of the notion. I argue that a significant flaw in Brunstetter’s conception is that it is too broadly applied to non-military actors. Then I argue that Frowe’s critique mistakenly ignores legitimate authority, which says that military force must be authorised by the appropriate political authority. Ultimately, the right to engage in armed conflict is grounded in the responsibility the political authority vests in its military institutions