Minority governments in Romania : a case of stable instability

Romanian politics is defined by stable instability. In thirty years of democratic experience (1990–2020), seventeen prime ministers chaired thirty-four cabinets. Cabinets had an average lifespan of less than a year. Minority cabinets are also a fixed feature of Romanian politics. Among post-communist states, the country tops the charts at more than double the amount of minority cabinets compared to runner-up Latvia. Between 1990 and 2020, over half of Romanian cabinets were minority cabinets (18/34, 53 percent). Among these, six were single-party minority cabinets (see Table 5.1). What explains the preference of Romanian parties to form minority cabinets? Does their minority status affect stability or cabinet performance? If so, under what conditions does either cabinet duration or cabinet performance improve? An analysis of the formation and lives of these cabinets provides a rare chance to observe politicians learning the merits of strategic behavior in a young multiparty environment. In doing so, we can also trace how institutions shape elite behavior in a new democracy and test some of the theories developed for Western Europe on new cases. I find empirical evidence in favor of the important role of the semi-presidential regime structure, and of party and party system features in minority cabinet formation. In particular, the role of the president in nominating the prime minister provides the president with formal and informal power over cabinet composition. Such power was often used to design minority cabinets in favor of the president’s party. Party and party system features refer to the presence of dominant parties, polarizing electoral competition, and the strategies of small parties. We also find that individual political goals and informal institutions—such as corruption and clientelism—play a fundamental role in making and breaking parliamentary alliances. These latter phenomena often shape legislative majorities, making individuals highly dependent on state resources and loosely bonded to a specific party. I posit that this encourages minority cabinet formation, as individual payoffs do not require cabinet membership for the whole party