We present a new characterization of the position value, one of the most prominent allocation rules for communication situations (graph-games or games with restricted communication). This characterization includes the PL-marginality property, an extension for communications situations of the classic marginality for TU-games, as well as component efficiency and balanced link contributions for necessary players
We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is...
A network is a graph where the nodes represent players and the links represent bilateral interaction...
We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social...
We present a new characterization of the position value, one of the most prominent allocation rules ...
In this article, we generalize the position value, defined by Meessen (1988) for the class of determ...
We provide a generalization of the position value (Meessen 1988) that allows players to benefit from...
We reconsider the Myerson value and the position value for communication situations. In case the und...
We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities....
We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of players and their links and ...
We propose new point valued solutions for global games. We explore the implications of weakening som...
In this work we consider hypergraph communication situations where for a group of actors the economi...
We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph. The most well-know...
In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the possibilities for cooperation between the p...
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In partic...
We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a comm...
We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is...
A network is a graph where the nodes represent players and the links represent bilateral interaction...
We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social...
We present a new characterization of the position value, one of the most prominent allocation rules ...
In this article, we generalize the position value, defined by Meessen (1988) for the class of determ...
We provide a generalization of the position value (Meessen 1988) that allows players to benefit from...
We reconsider the Myerson value and the position value for communication situations. In case the und...
We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities....
We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of players and their links and ...
We propose new point valued solutions for global games. We explore the implications of weakening som...
In this work we consider hypergraph communication situations where for a group of actors the economi...
We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph. The most well-know...
In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the possibilities for cooperation between the p...
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In partic...
We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a comm...
We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is...
A network is a graph where the nodes represent players and the links represent bilateral interaction...
We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social...