Brokers, Social Networks, Reciprocity, and Clientelism

Although canonical models of clientelism argue that brokers use dense social networks to monitor and enforce vote buying, recent evidence suggests that brokers can instead target intrinsically reciprocal voters and reduce the need for active monitoring and enforcement. Combining a trove of survey data on brokers and voters in the Philippines with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, and relying on local naming conventions to build social networks, we demonstrate that brokers employ both strategies conditional on the underlying social network structure. We show that brokers are chosen for their central position in networks and are knowledgeable about voters, including their reciprocity levels. We then show that, where village social networks are dense, brokers prefer to target voters who have many ties in the network because their votes are easiest to monitor. Where networks are sparse, brokers target intrinsically reciprocal voters whose behavior they need not monitor.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/175130/1/ajps12604.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/175130/2/ajps12604-sup-0001-SuppMat.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/175130/3/ajps12604_am.pd