We study reasoning in Levesque's logic of only knowing. In particular, we first prove that extending a decidable subset of first-order logic with the ability of reasoning about only knowing preserves decidability of reasoning, as long as quantifying-in is not allowed in the language, and define a general method for reasoning about only knowing in such a case. Then, we show that the problem of reasoning about only knowing in the propositional case Lies at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Thus, it is as hard as reasoning in the majority of propositional formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning, like default logic, circumscription, and autoepistemic logic, and it is easier than reasoning in propositional formalisms based on the minim...
The Church–Fitch argument, or 'paradox' of knowability, apparently shows that, if all truths are kno...
Several studies about computational complexity of nonmonotonic reasoning (NMR) showed that nonmonoto...
Only knowing captures the intuitive notion that the beliefs of an agent are precisely those that fol...
AbstractWe study reasoning in Levesque's logic of only knowing. In particular, we first prove that e...
A complete, recursive axiomatization of a subsystem of Levesque’s only-knowing logic is given. The s...
The idea of only-knowing a collection of sentences has been previously shown to have a close connec...
We present a tableau method for Levesque's logic of only knowing OL. More precisely, we define a tab...
Reasoning from the minimal models of a theory, as fostered by circumscription, is in the area of Art...
AbstractReasoning from the minimal models of a theory, as fostered by circumscription, is in the are...
AbstractWe show that the axiomatization given by Levesque for his logic of “only knowing” [2], which...
What does it mean to say that an agent only knows a particular fact,i.e., knowing that fact and not ...
We study the computational properties of the propositional fragment of MBNF, the logic of minimal be...
AbstractA fundamental problem in knowledge representation is that reasoning, if based on classical l...
In the most popular logics combining knowl-edge and awareness, it is not possible to express stateme...
Only knowing captures the intuitive notion that the beliefs of an agent are precisely those that fol...
The Church–Fitch argument, or 'paradox' of knowability, apparently shows that, if all truths are kno...
Several studies about computational complexity of nonmonotonic reasoning (NMR) showed that nonmonoto...
Only knowing captures the intuitive notion that the beliefs of an agent are precisely those that fol...
AbstractWe study reasoning in Levesque's logic of only knowing. In particular, we first prove that e...
A complete, recursive axiomatization of a subsystem of Levesque’s only-knowing logic is given. The s...
The idea of only-knowing a collection of sentences has been previously shown to have a close connec...
We present a tableau method for Levesque's logic of only knowing OL. More precisely, we define a tab...
Reasoning from the minimal models of a theory, as fostered by circumscription, is in the area of Art...
AbstractReasoning from the minimal models of a theory, as fostered by circumscription, is in the are...
AbstractWe show that the axiomatization given by Levesque for his logic of “only knowing” [2], which...
What does it mean to say that an agent only knows a particular fact,i.e., knowing that fact and not ...
We study the computational properties of the propositional fragment of MBNF, the logic of minimal be...
AbstractA fundamental problem in knowledge representation is that reasoning, if based on classical l...
In the most popular logics combining knowl-edge and awareness, it is not possible to express stateme...
Only knowing captures the intuitive notion that the beliefs of an agent are precisely those that fol...
The Church–Fitch argument, or 'paradox' of knowability, apparently shows that, if all truths are kno...
Several studies about computational complexity of nonmonotonic reasoning (NMR) showed that nonmonoto...
Only knowing captures the intuitive notion that the beliefs of an agent are precisely those that fol...