This article discusses an agreement by directors to pay a break fee during a takeover or a merger and highlight some corporate governance issues that may arise due to such payments. The article further discusses how regulators limit such payments. Takeover and merger agreements contain numerous terms and conditions intended to protect all parties to the transaction. The agreements are also aimed at ensuring that, where there is a breach, the innocent party is able to recoup the costs incurred in undertaking the transaction. Break fees are some of the terms and conditions included in the takeover and merger agreements known as deal protection measures. However, these terms and conditions raise a number of concerns for shareholders, directors...
The roles of the market for corporate control and institutional investor monitoring as corporate gov...
Global Merger and Acquisition activity reached record levels in 2006, with the US and EU playing a l...
This paper examines Delaware\u27s judicial treatment of deal protection measures, particularly termi...
The paper examines the motivation for termination fee use by proving evidence on the effects of inc...
We model takeovers as a bargaining process and explain termination fees for, both, the target and th...
In this Article, Professor John Coffee considers under what circumstances there could be a legitimat...
In this Article, Professor John Coffee considers under what circumstances there could be a legitimat...
In this Article, Professor John Coffee considers under what circumstances there could be a legitimat...
Since 2011, the United Kingdom has prohibited all deal protections—including termination fees—in mer...
The key findings of this dissertation indicate that the benefits and costs associated with sharehold...
This article serves as an overview to provide basic knowledge for people previously unacquainted wit...
Since 2011, the United Kingdom has prohibited all deal protections—including termination fees—in mer...
This thesis investigates the efficiency of the market for corporate control from different perspecti...
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side-payments in connection with...
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side payments in connection with...
The roles of the market for corporate control and institutional investor monitoring as corporate gov...
Global Merger and Acquisition activity reached record levels in 2006, with the US and EU playing a l...
This paper examines Delaware\u27s judicial treatment of deal protection measures, particularly termi...
The paper examines the motivation for termination fee use by proving evidence on the effects of inc...
We model takeovers as a bargaining process and explain termination fees for, both, the target and th...
In this Article, Professor John Coffee considers under what circumstances there could be a legitimat...
In this Article, Professor John Coffee considers under what circumstances there could be a legitimat...
In this Article, Professor John Coffee considers under what circumstances there could be a legitimat...
Since 2011, the United Kingdom has prohibited all deal protections—including termination fees—in mer...
The key findings of this dissertation indicate that the benefits and costs associated with sharehold...
This article serves as an overview to provide basic knowledge for people previously unacquainted wit...
Since 2011, the United Kingdom has prohibited all deal protections—including termination fees—in mer...
This thesis investigates the efficiency of the market for corporate control from different perspecti...
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side-payments in connection with...
In addition to golden parachutes, CEOs often negotiate for personal side payments in connection with...
The roles of the market for corporate control and institutional investor monitoring as corporate gov...
Global Merger and Acquisition activity reached record levels in 2006, with the US and EU playing a l...
This paper examines Delaware\u27s judicial treatment of deal protection measures, particularly termi...