We consider decision problems under complete ignorance and extend the minimax regret principle to situations where, after taking an action, the decision maker does not necessarily learn the state of the world. For example, if the decision maker only learns what the outcome is, then all she knows is that the actual state is one of the (possibly several) states that yield the observed outcome under the chosen action. We refer to this situation as imperfect ex-post information. We show that, given a choice between more information and less information, the decision maker prefers the latter. We also extend the framework to encompass the possibility of less than the extreme degree of pessimism that characterizes the minimax regret criterion
We introduce a general framework for formalizing and analyzing the problem faced by a Decision Maker...
Background. A generalization of the minimax regret criterion is represented as even the best-assuran...
In a partial monitoring game, the learner repeatedly chooses an action, the environment responds wit...
This paper clarifies and extends the model of anticipated regret and endogenous beliefs based on the...
In his discussion of minimax decision rules, Savage (1954, p. 170) presents an ex-ample purporting t...
We examine an adverse selection relationship in which the principal is unaware of the ex ante distri...
This paper provides an axiomatic model of decision making under uncertainty in which the decision ma...
This paper continues the investigation of minimax regret treatment choice initiated by Manski (2004)...
Our starting point is a setting where a decision maker's uncertainty is represented by a set of prob...
We consider an information design problem when the sender faces ambiguity regarding the probability ...
In his discussion of minimax decision rules, Savage (1954, p. 170) presents an example purporting to...
AbstractWe are concerned with the problem of uncertain decision making. The paradigm of decision mak...
In the standard mechanism design setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is not known...
This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the pos...
Existing models of regret aversion assume that individuals can make an ex-post comparison between th...
We introduce a general framework for formalizing and analyzing the problem faced by a Decision Maker...
Background. A generalization of the minimax regret criterion is represented as even the best-assuran...
In a partial monitoring game, the learner repeatedly chooses an action, the environment responds wit...
This paper clarifies and extends the model of anticipated regret and endogenous beliefs based on the...
In his discussion of minimax decision rules, Savage (1954, p. 170) presents an ex-ample purporting t...
We examine an adverse selection relationship in which the principal is unaware of the ex ante distri...
This paper provides an axiomatic model of decision making under uncertainty in which the decision ma...
This paper continues the investigation of minimax regret treatment choice initiated by Manski (2004)...
Our starting point is a setting where a decision maker's uncertainty is represented by a set of prob...
We consider an information design problem when the sender faces ambiguity regarding the probability ...
In his discussion of minimax decision rules, Savage (1954, p. 170) presents an example purporting to...
AbstractWe are concerned with the problem of uncertain decision making. The paradigm of decision mak...
In the standard mechanism design setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is not known...
This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the pos...
Existing models of regret aversion assume that individuals can make an ex-post comparison between th...
We introduce a general framework for formalizing and analyzing the problem faced by a Decision Maker...
Background. A generalization of the minimax regret criterion is represented as even the best-assuran...
In a partial monitoring game, the learner repeatedly chooses an action, the environment responds wit...