Cache-Assisted Content Delivery in Wireless Networks: A New Game Theoretic Model

With the rapid increase of mobile data traffic, efficient content delivery in wireless networks is increasingly important to provide broadcast and multicast services. To reduce network cost and enrich end-user quality of experience, Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs) are expected to collaborate to improve content delivery services. However, the influence of content popularity has been generally overlooked, and profit split problem between ISPs and CPs has not been studied. We investigate the novel economic behaviors between ISPs and CPs in the presence of edge caches, and formulate the profit split problem as a centralized model, which can achieve optimal content caching and maximal network benefits. A Stackelberg game is designed to obtain its distributed win-win solution, where a feasible backward induction is proposed and the influence of edge caches and content popularity is analyzed. Simulation results show that the performance of our proposed Stackelberg game model is comparable to the centralized alternative and much better than existing ISP-CP cooperative schemes not considering cache deployment in the network