Signalling, Sanctioning and Sensitising: How to Uphold Norms with Blame (pre-print)

This paper proposes a new theory of blame’s nature, arguing that it has the function of upholding norm compliance. Norm compliance is achieved by making agents competent with norms and motivated to exercise said competence, and blame achieves these through three effects. First, blame signals an agent’s commitment to a norm, which gives assurance to others that the norm will be complied with. Second, blame sanctions norm violations, thus deterring them. Third, blame sensitises agents, in a direct and indirect manner. Directly, it draws its target’s attention to their conduct, and induces emotional recognition of how the victim saw the conduct via empathy. Indirectly, it gives the target feedback on their conduct, which teaches them the nature of the norm, when it applies, and the weight that ought to be accorded to it compared to other norms. Additionally, by providing incentives to conform to the norm which the agent repeatedly tries to comply with, the agent gradually internalises the norm, after which they begin to experience the norm as intrinsically motivating. The paper closes by considering some implications of this theory for theorising about blame and blameworthiness