Panel Discussion The concept of Aesthetic Emotions in the age of neuroasthetics: a roundtable discussion

Empirical aesthetics and neuroaesthetics are usually defined as the scientific investigation of aesthetic experience and art (Chatterjee & Vartanian, 2014). However, what counts as “aesthetic” is often determined by philosophical thinking and not by scientific theories or evidence. The basic phenomena and problems that define “aesthetics” in the West date back to European philosophers from the 17th through 19th century, and were later adopted by psychologists and neuroscientists. Despite relying on assumptions about the human mind that predate our modern understanding of neurobiology and psychology (Hayn-Leichsenring & Chatterjee, 2019) contemporary research continues to be based on philosophical concepts that postulate distinct aesthetic experiences or emotions (Brielmann & Pelli, 2017, 2019; Chatterjee, 2014; Fingerhut, 2018; Fingerhut & Prinz, 2018, 2020). In a series of recent publications, Skov and Nadal (2019, 2020a, 2020b) question these assumptions. Specifically, they argue that there is little psychological or neuroscientific support for the idea that the emotional states we experience in response to artworks are distinct from emotional states generated by other, “adaptive”, sensory objects like food. This symposium will debate whether the concept of aesthetic emotions remains relevant to empirical aesthetics and neuroaesthetics, or if it is time to move on. Because of the online format of the conference, this symposium will be informal: First, Anjan Chatterjee, Joerg Fingerhut, Marcos Nadal and Martin Skov will provide short answers to two questions: (1)“Do aesthetic emotions exist as a distinct class of emotions?”, (2) “Is there empirical evidence for or against the idea that aesthetic pleasure is distinct from adaptive pleasure?”. Then Aenne Brielmann will summarize their pros and cons, and lead a roundtable discussion that will encourage audience participation