We propose a new functional form characterization of binary nonmanipulable social choice functions on a universal domain and an arbitrary, possibly infinite, set of agents. In order to achieve this, we considered the more general case of two-valued social choice functions and describe the structure of the family consisting of groups of agents having no power to determine the values of a nonmanipulable social choice function. With the help of such a structure, we introduce a class of functions that we call powerless revealing social choice functions and show that the binary nonmanipulable social choice functions are the powerless revealing ones
is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice fu...
The paper investigates the structure of coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions – CSP scf...
We axiomatically characterize the class of pairwise irresolute social choice functions that are grou...
We propose a new functional form characterization of binary nonmanipulable social choice functions o...
This paper is concerned with the number of profiles at which a nondictatorial social choice function...
We prove a representation formula that gives a new characterization of the coali- tionally strategy ...
We consider classes of non-manipulable two-valued social choice functions, i.e., social choice funct...
Recent literature has made significant progress in characterizing those social choice functions that...
Gibbard [gibbard, a., 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41, 587–6...
We extend the non-binary framework of social choice introduced by Aizerman and Aleskerov (1986), in ...
Non-manipulable direct revelation social choice functions are characterized for societies where the ...
This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous socia...
Social welfare functions for private goods economies with classical preferences are considered. It i...
This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous socia...
In this paper we introduce the plurality kth social choice function selecting an alternative, which ...
is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice fu...
The paper investigates the structure of coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions – CSP scf...
We axiomatically characterize the class of pairwise irresolute social choice functions that are grou...
We propose a new functional form characterization of binary nonmanipulable social choice functions o...
This paper is concerned with the number of profiles at which a nondictatorial social choice function...
We prove a representation formula that gives a new characterization of the coali- tionally strategy ...
We consider classes of non-manipulable two-valued social choice functions, i.e., social choice funct...
Recent literature has made significant progress in characterizing those social choice functions that...
Gibbard [gibbard, a., 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41, 587–6...
We extend the non-binary framework of social choice introduced by Aizerman and Aleskerov (1986), in ...
Non-manipulable direct revelation social choice functions are characterized for societies where the ...
This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous socia...
Social welfare functions for private goods economies with classical preferences are considered. It i...
This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous socia...
In this paper we introduce the plurality kth social choice function selecting an alternative, which ...
is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice fu...
The paper investigates the structure of coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions – CSP scf...
We axiomatically characterize the class of pairwise irresolute social choice functions that are grou...