Abstract: Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we however argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises
Numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enh...
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits ob...
Promising serves as an important commitment mechanism by operating on a potential cheater’s internal...
Abstract: Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit ...
Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different ...
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior...
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in ...
We examine, experimentally and theoretically, how communication within a partnership may mitigate th...
According to several psychological and economic studies, non-binding communication can be an effecti...
Promises are crucial for human cooperation because they allow people to enter into voluntary commitm...
We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and ...
Previous research indicates that unenforceable informal contracts (or commit- ments) promote trust a...
RePEc Working Paper Series: No. 14/2011Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase co...
Numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enh...
This paper experimentally investigates the hypothesis that promise-keeping behavior is affected by t...
Numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enh...
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits ob...
Promising serves as an important commitment mechanism by operating on a potential cheater’s internal...
Abstract: Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit ...
Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different ...
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior...
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in ...
We examine, experimentally and theoretically, how communication within a partnership may mitigate th...
According to several psychological and economic studies, non-binding communication can be an effecti...
Promises are crucial for human cooperation because they allow people to enter into voluntary commitm...
We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and ...
Previous research indicates that unenforceable informal contracts (or commit- ments) promote trust a...
RePEc Working Paper Series: No. 14/2011Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase co...
Numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enh...
This paper experimentally investigates the hypothesis that promise-keeping behavior is affected by t...
Numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enh...
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits ob...
Promising serves as an important commitment mechanism by operating on a potential cheater’s internal...