Purpose: Based on the fact that punishment and subsidy mechanisms affect the anti-epidemic incentives of major participants in a society, the issue of this paper is how the penalty and subsidy mechanisms affect the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers during Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Design/Methodology/approach: This paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game theory, involving governments, businesses, and consumers, to analyze the evolutionary stable strategies and the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on their strategy selection during COVID-19. We then uses numerical analysis to simulate the strategy formation process of governments, businesses, and consumers for the results of tripartite evolutionar...
We design and analyze a multi-level game-theoretic model of hierarchical policy interventions for ep...
In this work, we provide a general mathematical formalism to study the optimal control of an epidemi...
Considering the two-stage supply chain composed of a leading retailer and a manufacturer under the b...
abstract: How effective are governmental incentives to achieve widespread vaccination coverage so as...
Most governments employ a set of quasi-standard measures to fight COVID-19, including wearing masks,...
The classification of COVID-19 as a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO), substantiated a...
Background: The word \u27pandemic\u27 conjures dystopian images of bodies stacked in the streets and...
The outbreak and persistence of COVID-19 have posed a great threat to global public health and econo...
Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperati...
The present research conducts a formal analysis of the interactive decisions concerning the enterpri...
We build an evolutionary game-theoretic model of the interaction between policymakers and experts in...
Governments across the world are currently facing the task of selecting suitable intervention strate...
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, strengthening collaborative prevention and control of publi...
We provide a game-theoretical epidemiological model for the COVID-19 pandemic that takes into accoun...
In this paper, we model an evolutionary noncooperative game between politicians and citizens that, g...
We design and analyze a multi-level game-theoretic model of hierarchical policy interventions for ep...
In this work, we provide a general mathematical formalism to study the optimal control of an epidemi...
Considering the two-stage supply chain composed of a leading retailer and a manufacturer under the b...
abstract: How effective are governmental incentives to achieve widespread vaccination coverage so as...
Most governments employ a set of quasi-standard measures to fight COVID-19, including wearing masks,...
The classification of COVID-19 as a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO), substantiated a...
Background: The word \u27pandemic\u27 conjures dystopian images of bodies stacked in the streets and...
The outbreak and persistence of COVID-19 have posed a great threat to global public health and econo...
Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperati...
The present research conducts a formal analysis of the interactive decisions concerning the enterpri...
We build an evolutionary game-theoretic model of the interaction between policymakers and experts in...
Governments across the world are currently facing the task of selecting suitable intervention strate...
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, strengthening collaborative prevention and control of publi...
We provide a game-theoretical epidemiological model for the COVID-19 pandemic that takes into accoun...
In this paper, we model an evolutionary noncooperative game between politicians and citizens that, g...
We design and analyze a multi-level game-theoretic model of hierarchical policy interventions for ep...
In this work, we provide a general mathematical formalism to study the optimal control of an epidemi...
Considering the two-stage supply chain composed of a leading retailer and a manufacturer under the b...