This paper assesses the impact of the production and use of an intermediate good upon the location of productive activity in an economy consisting of two asymmetrically sized regions. The Nash equilibria of locations of an upstream and two downstream firms are completely defined in the the space of parameters ‘‘transport cost’’ and ‘‘intensity of vertical linkages’’. While the relationship between transport cost and agglomeration is usually regarded as a decreasing one, the inclusion of an intermediate good can make it nonmonotonic.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
This paper models the decision of vertically-linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
International audienceIn a model à la Venables of 1996 Venables, A. J. (1996) Equilibrium locations ...
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms ...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its re...
This paper is an appraisal of the economic feasibility of the location of clusters of firms in perip...
The paper examines the relative importance for industrial location of production linkages and knowle...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper models the decision of vertically linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
The paper treats a noncooperative game where an upstream firm and two downstream firms select locati...
This paper deals with the location of input supply in a two country spatial economy. A duopoly suppl...
In a game where firms select locations, technological interactions through the exchange of intermedi...
It is argued that the trade-off interaction between agglomeration economies and transportation costs...
This paper models the decision of vertically-linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
International audienceIn a model à la Venables of 1996 Venables, A. J. (1996) Equilibrium locations ...
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms ...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its re...
This paper is an appraisal of the economic feasibility of the location of clusters of firms in perip...
The paper examines the relative importance for industrial location of production linkages and knowle...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper models the decision of vertically linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
The paper treats a noncooperative game where an upstream firm and two downstream firms select locati...
This paper deals with the location of input supply in a two country spatial economy. A duopoly suppl...
In a game where firms select locations, technological interactions through the exchange of intermedi...
It is argued that the trade-off interaction between agglomeration economies and transportation costs...
This paper models the decision of vertically-linked firms to build either partitioned or connected n...
International audienceIn a model à la Venables of 1996 Venables, A. J. (1996) Equilibrium locations ...
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms ...