We analyze single binary-choice voting rules and identify the presence of the No-show paradox in this simple setting, as a consequence of specific turnout or quorum conditions that are included in actual rules. Since these conditions are meant to ensure a representative outcome, we try to formalize this concern and reach our main result: no voting rule can ensure representation if abstention is possible, unless specific restrictive assumptions are made on the preference domain of abstainers. We then focus on the main referendum systems and show that appropriate restrictions do make them compatible with representation. The main purpose of our paper is, however, to provide a tool for referendum design. Unawareness of the fact that defining a ...
First published: 26 September 2003This paper presents results from a study of turnout in the 1994 Eu...
Voting rules are powerful tools that allow multi-ple agents to aggregate their preferences in order ...
Two approaches are considered in an attempt to mollify previous observations regarding the very nega...
We analyze single binary-choice voting rules and identify the presence of the No-Show paradox in thi...
The majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of t...
In this article, we focus on the consequences of quorum requirements for turnout in referendums. We ...
This paper analyzes a yes-no referendum in which its outcome is valid only if the voter turnout is g...
The paper works with a formal model of referenda, where a finite number of voters can choose between...
International audienceIt may happen that the favorite candidate of a voter loses an election if that...
The majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of t...
We discuss two inter-related puzzling features of the literature on a priori voting power. First, th...
The majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of t...
Abstention is a key issue for any representative democracy. Turnout has a direct impact on the input...
This Article examines the effect of abstentions on the outcome of votes. Scholars (and voters) opera...
First published: 26 September 2003This paper presents results from a study of turnout in the 1994 Eu...
Voting rules are powerful tools that allow multi-ple agents to aggregate their preferences in order ...
Two approaches are considered in an attempt to mollify previous observations regarding the very nega...
We analyze single binary-choice voting rules and identify the presence of the No-Show paradox in thi...
The majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of t...
In this article, we focus on the consequences of quorum requirements for turnout in referendums. We ...
This paper analyzes a yes-no referendum in which its outcome is valid only if the voter turnout is g...
The paper works with a formal model of referenda, where a finite number of voters can choose between...
International audienceIt may happen that the favorite candidate of a voter loses an election if that...
The majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of t...
We discuss two inter-related puzzling features of the literature on a priori voting power. First, th...
The majority of the participating voters in referenda does not necessarily reflect the majority of t...
Abstention is a key issue for any representative democracy. Turnout has a direct impact on the input...
This Article examines the effect of abstentions on the outcome of votes. Scholars (and voters) opera...
First published: 26 September 2003This paper presents results from a study of turnout in the 1994 Eu...
Voting rules are powerful tools that allow multi-ple agents to aggregate their preferences in order ...
Two approaches are considered in an attempt to mollify previous observations regarding the very nega...