Morality and pacifism

This thesis adopts a specific teleological moral theory for an analysis of absolute and utilitarian pacifism. The nature of utilitarian and absolute moral principles are discussed and compared to a theory of value suggesting that the non-moral good we are morally obliged to promote is the maximization of the satisfaction of everyone's preferences. The absolute and utilitarian pacifists claim to know that every war has been or will be morally unjustified prior to an examination of the foreseeable consequences. From the moral perspective advocated in this thesis the complete renunciation of all war can not be plausibly morally defended. An argument for unilateral pacifism is also criticized and shown to be mistaken. It is proposed moreover that the acceptance of self-defence as a prima facie principle on an individual and national level may have a high acceptance-utility. Pacifism is not logically self-contradictory but nonetheless represents the raising of a single substantive moral principle above all other principles thereby over-simplifying morality. The maximization of the satisfaction of preferences however does not lead to a similar over-simplification