The Authoritarian Shortcut: Russia's Unorthodox Population-Centric Counterinsurgency during the Second Chechen War and Strategic Implications for Western Military Planners

Dissertation title: The Authoritarian Shortcut: Russia's Unorthodox Population-Centric Counterinsurgency during the Second Chechen War and Strategic Implications for Western Military Planners. Author: Roberto Colombo Abstract For authoritarian incumbents, waging counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare is often a wantonly cruel, yet remarkably successful business. While previous research has shown that authoritarian regimes employ a wide array of kinetic and non-kinetic techniques to suppress insurgency, the authoritarian model of COIN warfare remains heavily under-theorised. This study proposes a novel theoretical framework expounding the logic of authoritarian COIN operations and empirically examines its mechanisms by looking at Russia's COIN experience during the Second Chechen War. In investigating the strategic rationale underpinning the authoritarian toolkit of COIN measures, this research aims at establishing whether authoritarian counterinsurgents can effectively deliver mission success. Drawing upon a large pool of secondary sources and primary data collected during face-to-face interviews with eyewitnesses of the Chechen conflict, this study demonstrates that Moscow prevailed against the rebels by resorting to a sophisticated combination of heavy-handed intelligence, information, military, political, and..