Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict

Resource wealth induces predation incentives but also conflict-deterring third-party involvement. As a result, the relation between resource value and conflict probability is a priori unclear. This paper studies such relation with a flexible theoretical framework involving a resource holder, a predator, and a powerful third party. First, we show that, if third-party incentives to intervene are sufficiently strong, conflict probability is hump-shaped in the resource value. Second, we theoretically establish that resource value increases the third party's incentive to side with the resource-rich defendant in case of intervention, providing another mechanism for stabilization when the resource value is high. Third, exploiting widely-used measures of resource value and geologic predictors of oil presence, we provide evidence for our theoretical results. Using data on military bases and arms' trade, we show suggestive evidence that US military inuence drives a non-monotonicity of conflict probability in oil value