We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We present two mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first is Pareto efficient and undominated—in terms of the number of assignments—in equilibrium. The second is fair for unassigned agents and assigns weakly more agents than any stable mechanism in equilibrium
We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have arrivals and departures and stri...
In this paper, I examine the problem of matching or assigning a fixed set of goods or services to a ...
This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a ...
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We pres...
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We show...
When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assign...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
We allocate agents to three kinds of hierarchical positions: top, medium, and low. No monetary trans...
We consider an environment where agents must be allocated to one of three kinds of hierarchical posi...
Agent societies generally aim at collective provision of services (capabilities or resources) in a m...
Abstract: We study the “house allocation ” problem in which n agents are assigned n objects, one for...
We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit s...
We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simple sequential mechan...
We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simple sequential mechan...
We consider designing a mechanism to allocate objects among agents without monetary transfers. There...
We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have arrivals and departures and stri...
In this paper, I examine the problem of matching or assigning a fixed set of goods or services to a ...
This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a ...
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We pres...
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We show...
When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assign...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
We allocate agents to three kinds of hierarchical positions: top, medium, and low. No monetary trans...
We consider an environment where agents must be allocated to one of three kinds of hierarchical posi...
Agent societies generally aim at collective provision of services (capabilities or resources) in a m...
Abstract: We study the “house allocation ” problem in which n agents are assigned n objects, one for...
We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit s...
We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simple sequential mechan...
We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simple sequential mechan...
We consider designing a mechanism to allocate objects among agents without monetary transfers. There...
We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have arrivals and departures and stri...
In this paper, I examine the problem of matching or assigning a fixed set of goods or services to a ...
This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a ...
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