At the Source of the Myth. The Historiography of the Polish People’s Republic on the Strategic and Operational Background of the Battle of Lenino

This article is an attempt to examine the Communist-era historiography of the Battle of Lenino by introducing the context of the fighting in Belarus in 1943. The operational and strategic analysis of the tasks of the Western Front and the forces serving there shows the scale of Soviet operations in the autumn of 1943, and the size of the defeats they suffered. One of the battles conducted at the turn of 1944 in the Belarusian direction was the second Orsha operation of October 12–18, 1943. Due to mistakes made at the planning stage, the offensive towards Orsha turned into a bloody battle that took place in the area between the towns of Lenino and Bayevo. Throughout the existence of the USSR, Soviet historiography diminished the importance of the fighting in Belarus in 1943 and avoided research into this operation. The military historians of the Polish People’s Republic were in a different situation; they had a keen interest in the Battle of Lenino because of its propaganda importance. In all the academic publications from the period of the Polish People’s Republic, military historians presented only the first two days of the battle of the 1st Infantry Division at Lenino, avoiding any descriptions of the broader background of the operation, even though they had access to German military sources. The reason was the political dependence of the Polish People’s Republic and the Polish People’s Army to the USSR, which made any criticism of the Red Army impossible. As a result, the battle of Lenino was mythologised: it was presented as a success for the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division