Constitutional identity and the relativisation of human rights protection

The phenomenon of “constitutional identity” is characterized by the ambiguity of the concept as well as the diverse, multifaceted scope of its application. This paper focuses on a particular dimension of constitutional identity and considers whether, beyond its added values, there is a potential danger of using this construct to rela-tivise the protection of particular fundamental rights and to lower the standard of protection of these rights at the national level. It is noticeable that individual states refer to particular aspects of constitutional identity, determined by a specific cul-tural or historical context, e.g. in disputes on supranational and international levels. Unfortunately, identity arguments are particularly tempting for the authorities in states departing from liberal democracy – such authorities are especially predestined to relativise the freedoms and rights of various minorities, whom they identify as the “enemy” of the monolithic real people. As an illustration of these dangers, the author uses the example of Hungary, which is peculiar in that the populist Fidesz party succeeded in gaining a constitutional majority and having a new Hungarian Basic Law passed in 2011