International audienceMost of the decision procedures for symbolic analysis of protocols are limited to a fixed set of algebraic operators associated with a fixed intruder theory. Examples of such sets of operators comprise XOR, multiplication, abstract encryption/decryption. In this report we give an algorithm for combining decision procedures for arbitrary intruder theories with disjoint sets of operators, provided that solvability of ordered intruder constraints, a slight generalization of intruder constraints, can be decided in each theory. This is the case for most of the intruder theories for which a decision procedure has been given. In particular our result allows us to decide trace-based security properties of protocols that employ...
AbstractWe are interested in the design of automated procedures for analyzing the (in)security of cr...
We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding wheth...
We are interested in the design of automated procedures for analyzing the (in)security of cryptograp...
International audienceMost of the decision procedures for symbolic analysis of protocols are limited...
AbstractMost of the decision procedures for symbolic analysis of protocols are limited to a fixed se...
Most of the decision procedures for symbolic analysis of protocols are limited to a fixed set of alg...
Edited by Tudor Jebelean, Wei Li, Dongming WangInternational audienceMany decision problems on secur...
We present decidability results for the verification of cryptographic protocols in the presence of e...
Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators....
Abstract. Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic ...
We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in presence of the standa...
Many decision problems on security protocols can be reduced to solving so-called intruder constraint...
International audienceSecurity of a cryptographic protocol for a bounded number of sessions is usual...
We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in presence of the standa...
AbstractWe are interested in the design of automated procedures for analyzing the (in)security of cr...
We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding wheth...
We are interested in the design of automated procedures for analyzing the (in)security of cryptograp...
International audienceMost of the decision procedures for symbolic analysis of protocols are limited...
AbstractMost of the decision procedures for symbolic analysis of protocols are limited to a fixed se...
Most of the decision procedures for symbolic analysis of protocols are limited to a fixed set of alg...
Edited by Tudor Jebelean, Wei Li, Dongming WangInternational audienceMany decision problems on secur...
We present decidability results for the verification of cryptographic protocols in the presence of e...
Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators....
Abstract. Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic ...
We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in presence of the standa...
Many decision problems on security protocols can be reduced to solving so-called intruder constraint...
International audienceSecurity of a cryptographic protocol for a bounded number of sessions is usual...
We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in presence of the standa...
AbstractWe are interested in the design of automated procedures for analyzing the (in)security of cr...
We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding wheth...
We are interested in the design of automated procedures for analyzing the (in)security of cryptograp...