We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the effect of competition on risk taking in a contest in which players only decide on the level of risk they wish to take. Taking more risk implies a chance of a higher performance, but also implies a higher chance of failure. We vary the level of competition in two ways: by varying the number of players (2 players versus 8 players), and by varying the sensitivity of the contest to differences in performance (lottery contest versus all-pay auction). Our results show that there is a significant interaction effect between the two treatments, suggesting that players are particularly prone to take more risks if both the number of players and the sensitivity to performance are higher
We study contests where, subject only to a capacity constraint on mean performance, contestants comp...
One key motivation for using contests in real-life is the substantial evidence reported in empirical...
We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen b...
We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the effect of competition on risk taking in a cont...
We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the effect of competition on risk taking in a cont...
The effect of competition on risk-taking in contests (with Jan Potters) We investigate, theoreti...
We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able cont...
We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of ...
We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of ...
We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, risk is chosen by one o...
International audienceThis paper studies the role of risk attitudes in determining the optimality of...
I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock...
This study provides a unified theoretical and experimental framework in which to compare three canon...
In a contest, participants spend money or effort to increase their chances of winning a prize. The a...
It has been established in the literature that, under the assumption of risk-neutral contestants, it...
We study contests where, subject only to a capacity constraint on mean performance, contestants comp...
One key motivation for using contests in real-life is the substantial evidence reported in empirical...
We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen b...
We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the effect of competition on risk taking in a cont...
We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the effect of competition on risk taking in a cont...
The effect of competition on risk-taking in contests (with Jan Potters) We investigate, theoreti...
We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able cont...
We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of ...
We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of ...
We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, risk is chosen by one o...
International audienceThis paper studies the role of risk attitudes in determining the optimality of...
I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock...
This study provides a unified theoretical and experimental framework in which to compare three canon...
In a contest, participants spend money or effort to increase their chances of winning a prize. The a...
It has been established in the literature that, under the assumption of risk-neutral contestants, it...
We study contests where, subject only to a capacity constraint on mean performance, contestants comp...
One key motivation for using contests in real-life is the substantial evidence reported in empirical...
We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen b...