Incremental Design of Perishable Goods Markets through Multi-Agent Simulations

In current markets of perishable goods such as fish and vegetables, sellers are typically in a weak bargaining position, since perishable products cannot be stored for long without losing their value. To avoid the risk of spoiling products, sellers have few alternatives other than selling their goods at the prices offered by buyers in the markets. The market mechanism needs to be reformed in order to resolve unfairness between sellers and buyers. Double auction markets, which collect bids from both sides of the trades and match them, allow sellers to participate proactively in the price-making process. However, in perishable goods markets, sellers have an incentive to discount their bid gradually for fear of spoiling unsold goods. Buyers can take advantage of sellers’ discounted bids to increase their profit by strategic bidding. To solve the problem, we incrementally improve an online double auction mechanism for perishable goods markets, which promotes buyers’ truthful bidding by penalizing their failed bids without harming their individual rationality. We evaluate traders’ behavior under several market conditions using multi-agent simulations and show that the developed mechanism achieves fair resource allocation among traders