The conservative case for the Constitution, part II: The role of consensus

The United States federal government is a complicated system of interlocking branches, widely dispersed powers, and confusing lines of authority. No other feature of the American system has attracted more criticism. During the ratification debates of 1787–88, Anti-Federalist critics of the Constitution complained that it was overcomplicated, too difficult for the average person to understand, and thus likely to be dominated by economic and social elites. They believed republics should be simple in design so the people can exercise their sovereignty. Progressives such as Woodrow Wilson offered similar critiques from the end of the 19th century into the early 20th century. Progressives in the 21st century echo these older grievances when they talk about how the Constitution, through its intricate array of checks and balances, thwarts "democracy."As it is, none of the Federalist Papers, written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in defense of the Constitution, offer a comprehensive response to this critique. "Publius," the nom de plume they used to publish the essays, focuses on the need for a national union and then a more detailed defense of particular governmental institutions—as these were the main critiques leveled by the opponents to the Constitution in 1787–88.One may be forgiven, therefore, in thinking that the whole of the Constitution is less than the sum of its parts and that there is not an underlying logic that animates the creation of not just a national union but also this specific form of a union. However, there is a unifying principle to the constitutional system, one grounded in the framers' particular understanding of republican government. The system is purposeful in its demand that consensus among the people be achieved before government action. In that way, the Constitution reduces the chances that the government is corrupted into a majoritarian tyranny