Consideration of the Idea of Reverence for the Lives of Animals in the Philosophical Discourse in the Pre-modern Age2. On animals’ souls: Leibniz and the sentience of animals

Arguments developed in the previous discussion suggested the importance of ‘reverence for life’ in animal ethics. In the pre-modern age, natural science developed dramatically through experimental activities, and philosophers regarded reasoning, understanding, and the human mind as representing the most refined essence of human nature. Views on animals were not sophisticated, and cruel recreation using animals was commonly practiced. In that age, Leibniz, who opposed Descartes’ ideas, asserted the existence of monads or souls in ani¬mals. He did not regard animals as machine-like, inorganic living things. He described perceptions and souls that comprised the energy of life and proposed that these made animals what they were as living things. David Hume was a philosopher who recognized animals’ reason. He treated the issue of the relation between animals and humans earlier than utilitarian ideas of animal ethics of the 19th century. Hume clearly confirmed the sentience of animals and their rational essence in his discourses. Although the idea of animals’ souls did not spread, it was associated with the concept of animals’ sentience, which became an important aspect of animal ethics in a later age. The recognition of the sentience of animals is essential to the idea of reverence for the lives of animals