Intrinsic Comparative Statics Of A Nash Bargaining Solution

A generalization of the class of bargaining problems examined by Engwerda and Douven [(2008) On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution, Int. J. Game Theory 37, 265-279] is studied. The generalized class consists of nonconvex bargaining problems in which the feasible set satisfies the requirement that the set of weak Pareto-optimal solutions can be described by a smooth function. The intrinsic comparative statics of the aforesaid class are derived and shown to be characterized by a symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix, and an upper bound to the rank of the matrix is established. A corollary to this basic result is that a Nash bargaining solution is intrinsically a locally nondecreasing function of its own disagreement point. Other heretofore unknown results are similarly deduced from the basic result