CRIMINALITA' E ‘DISORDINE’

I poteri criminali si manifestano in una varietà di forme ed esercitano una varietà di controlli e pressioni sulla società e l'economia. In che modo investono il governo il territorio? Rispondere a questa domanda (non è inutile ricordare) dovrebbe essere un'elementare priorità delle politiche nazionali per ragioni di diritto costituzionale; ma è comunque interessante per molti osservatori (basti pensare ai rapporti di studio su l'ecomafia e, più tradizionalmente, sull'abusivismo edilizio) per comprendere le condizioni specifiche di gran parte del Sud. Per chi si occupa di pianificazione, si puo' forse articolare il quesito in tre domande più specifiche: se gli interessi criminali esercitino pressioni sul processo di piano e inducano effetti simili o diversi da quelli operati da interessi leciti più o meno regolarmente manifestati (corruzione inclusa); se un esercizio civicamente orientato del governo del territorio possa dare un contributo specifico al contrasto delle attività illegali; se infine l'insieme delle attività pubbliche attivate nei processi di piano sorregga una crescita di consapevolezza che sia di premessa a un cambiamento di regime anche nei due casi precedenti. Le vicende di Bagheria e Gela (oggetto rispettivamente di una ricerca recente e di una appena iniziata) consentono di rispondere -solo in parte, ma in modo positivo- alle ultime due domande; ma aiutano a impostare anche la prima, sulla quale si vorrebbe suggerire la necessità di un dibattito per tutto il mezzogiorno. Infatti, piano locale e globale, territorio e politica, si intrecciano dappertutto in molti modi; ma è evidente, però, che gli effetti su città e territori nei quali poteri, economie e culture criminali sono presenti con forza, se non dominanti, sono rivelatori di situazioni estreme ma significative dalle quali tutta la cultura della pianificazione avrebbe da apprendere.How do crime organizations affect planning and spatial government? Finding an answer to this question should be a priority of national policies. For now, it is at least an interesting task for scholars and researchers attempting to understand the state of Southern regions in Italy. In this context, three potential research questions already suggest themselves. First, does organized crime affect planning processes in ways that are similar or dissimilar to those followed by legal interests? Second, does a better governance contrast illegal activities more effectively? And third, do correct public policies support the development of a political concern able to foster a regime change? The Sicilian cities of Bagheria and Gela have been studied of late, and can provide an initial positive answer at least to the last two of these questions, also helping to frame the first one, which still requires a broader enquiry. Both cities point out that the game of crime and politics constitutes/inflicts a strain on the planning process that may be generalized. They further bring forth interesting results regarding the provision of experimental public services when a national government replaces local representatives with appointed civil servants because of the acknowledged presence of illegal connections with the mafia organizations. The dissolution of local government is the end point of a long process of deterioration. In these extreme conditions, civil servants have implemented rigorous policies, as well as a political approach. In fact, imposing legality requires strong will and resilient political strategies, in order to support a change in the administrative behavior. Local plans and decisions have been “deconstructed” to reveal their hidden links with the mafia's affairs. A continuous control on the activity of public employees in different offices has shown the grey areas of passive support to illegal powers. The redesigning of spatial development decisions, and of the regulatory procedures was aimed to reduce those areas. These measures and the new governance style have heavily affected criminal business. Crime organizations are in fact interested in many different aspects of local governments. As profit oriented organizations, they invest in land development (for instance, in commercial centers); as a quasi-jurisdictional power, they need to control space, provide safe houses, manage a spatial logistic of goods, etc.; being involved in public procurements, they try to influence administrative regulations. In doing so, they perversely provide for some development and local welfare, and their importance grows exponentially as public provision worsens. The strength of crime is due, thus, to combined factors: benefits to a few; threads to many; and institutional decay, all at the same time. Most of the researchers in this field have pinpointed the role of illegal organizations as opposed to the modernization process, while some have enquired into the mutual influence of modernization and mafia, as shown by the concept of “institutional disorder” Donolo (2001). The following reports try to explore spatial policies in this condition of extreme disorder, and show how they affect urban space and planning frames