Fine-Grained Detection of Privilege Escalation Attacks on Browser ExtensionsProgramming Languages and Systems

Even though their architecture relies on robust security principles, it is well-known that poor programming practices may expose browser extensions to serious security flaws, leading to privilege escalations by untrusted web pages or compromised extension components. We propose a formal security analysis of browser extensions in terms of a fine-grained characterization of the privileges that an active opponent may escalate through the message passing interface and we discuss to which extent current programming practices take this threat into account. Our theory builds on a formal language that embodies the essential features of JavaScript, together with few additional constructs dealing with the security aspects specific to the browser extension architecture. We then present a flow logic specification estimating the safety of browser extensions modeled in our language against the threats of privilege escalation and we prove its soundness. Finally, we show the feasibility of our approach by means of Chen, a prototype static analyser for Google Chrome extensions based on our flow logic specification