Politics after Turkey’s exit from democracy

In this article, I argue that well before the municipal elections of 31 May 2019 and the rerun of the elections in Istanbul on 23 June, Turkey had ceased to be a democracy even according to its most minimal definition. But the destruction of the country’s feeble democratic institutions – and more generally speaking of its state institutions – does not connote the end of contentious politics and the struggle for power and change in society. In fact, and as I will cautiously suggest by way of conclusion, it may even allow for the emergence of a democratic challenge to the current dictatorship and the authoritarian regime more generally, which the political field in Turkey has so far not witnessed. With few exceptions, Turkey has been a ‘Democracy without Democrats’,8 even if not exactly in the way, Ghassan Salamé advanced the concept to critique the ‘robust authoritarian’9 regimes of the Middle East and their (mis)use of electoral processes to create façade democracies. The Turkish variant of a hybrid setup of functioning democratic institutions without politicians practising a spirit of moderation, civility and respect for the public good was largely owed to Turkey’s western orientation during the Cold War. This arrangement allowed not only for the military to act as guardian of the regime, but facilitated political parties and their leaders to participate in electoral politics without committing themselves to democratic conventions. An authoritarian habitus has therefore been a constant in Turkey’s politics.10 With the rise of the candidate of the Republican People’s Party for the Istanbul mayoralty, Ekrem Imamoğlu, we may be witnessing at least the possibility of a pragmatic political alternative to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and a transition of the main opposition party into a party dedicated to democratic values and the greater public good