Reclaiming Specific-Intent Under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Business Theoretical Approach
- Elias T. Xenos
DOIAbstract
Article published in the Michigan State University School of Law Student Scholarship Collection
Article published in the Michigan State University School of Law Student Scholarship Collection
In one sentence § 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize” or “...
The antitrust laws are fully stated in two statutes that seem absurdly brief in relation to the work...
This essay considers the general definition of unlawful exclusionary practices under Section 2 of th...
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU, antitrust decision-makers use firms’ intent...
Many legal rules turn on a party\u27s state of mind or intent with respect to some action or consequ...
The role of intent in federal antitrust cases has been characterized as “unsettled” and “controversi...
This Article ascertains the overall purpose of the antitrust statutes in two very different ways. Fi...
The Gypsum decision supplies the proper occasion for a renewed effort to sort out and line up the Co...
Following the Civil War in the United States, American industry embarked upon a period of truly rem...
This article will evaluate the intent issue in several steps. First, Gypsum and its progeny will be ...
The efforts of activist antitrust lawyers to redefine the contours of attempted monopolization under...
The focus of modern applications of economic reasoning to antitrust concerns has been on the more su...
While recent decisions leave no doubt that the Court has revised its view concerning the purpose or ...
The attempt clause 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act deals with unilateral behavior which produces or i...
When an attorney discovers clear evidence that his corporate client has committed an antitrust felon...
In one sentence § 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize” or “...
The antitrust laws are fully stated in two statutes that seem absurdly brief in relation to the work...
This essay considers the general definition of unlawful exclusionary practices under Section 2 of th...
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU, antitrust decision-makers use firms’ intent...
Many legal rules turn on a party\u27s state of mind or intent with respect to some action or consequ...
The role of intent in federal antitrust cases has been characterized as “unsettled” and “controversi...
This Article ascertains the overall purpose of the antitrust statutes in two very different ways. Fi...
The Gypsum decision supplies the proper occasion for a renewed effort to sort out and line up the Co...
Following the Civil War in the United States, American industry embarked upon a period of truly rem...
This article will evaluate the intent issue in several steps. First, Gypsum and its progeny will be ...
The efforts of activist antitrust lawyers to redefine the contours of attempted monopolization under...
The focus of modern applications of economic reasoning to antitrust concerns has been on the more su...
While recent decisions leave no doubt that the Court has revised its view concerning the purpose or ...
The attempt clause 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act deals with unilateral behavior which produces or i...
When an attorney discovers clear evidence that his corporate client has committed an antitrust felon...
In one sentence § 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize” or “...
The antitrust laws are fully stated in two statutes that seem absurdly brief in relation to the work...
This essay considers the general definition of unlawful exclusionary practices under Section 2 of th...
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