Intellectual Courage in the Face of Intractable Normative Disagreement

Ordinary people disagree about normative questions (e.g., morality, politics) constantly. But so do philosophers—the people specially trained to investigate these questions. Isn’t it bad news for our normative views if even the best-trained people, who devote their lives to investigating these questions, can’t agree about the correct answers? Many have thought so. But I think they’re wrong. This dissertation explains why. It consists of three papers with an introduction and conclusion. In the first two papers, I consider three types of disagreement-based challenges to our realistically-construed normative views: metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic challenges. I argue that all of these challenges fail because they share the following structural flaw: they all treat normative disagreement as especially problematic. But it’s not. Every part of philosophy is shot through with deep, intractable disagreement. That includes metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language, the disciplines from which these challenges emerge. I argue that this fact causes big problems for these disagreement-based challenges. So the first two papers are about how not to think about normative disagreement. The third paper is about how we ought to think about it. Many have thought that intellectual humility requires us to give up our normative views in the face of intractable controversy. I think they’re wrong. I argue that another virtue of the mind is just as important as intellectual humility but has been almost completely ignored: intellectual courage. I develop a novel account of this virtue and argue that intellectually courageous agents are sometimes justified in retaining their normative views in the face of disagreement from smart, well-informed, well-motivated people. The story in brief: just as taking calculated practical risks is part of the well-lived practical life, so taking calculated intellectual risks is part of the well-lived intellectual life. So sometimes suspension of judgment in the face of controversy can be a form of intellectual cowardice, not humility, and taking a stand can be just what intellectual virtue requires.Doctor of Philosoph