Proposal for an intra-discipline communicability in Psychology

Developmental psychologists are aimed to identify, describe and explain psychological changes from one age to the other. Nevertheless, research can not reach all these aims in the same time. In any case, according to D\u2019Odorico (1995), all these empirical levels are equally important and can be considered successive steps to reach the understanding of a given phenomenon. What we argue is that the nature of these steps is not mono-directional but circular. In other words, explanation of change needs a description of phenomena changing. On the other hand, the observation of psychological phenomena depends on the identification of those conceptual variables, derived from the theoretical background adopted to explain change. What is often ignored is that, as an operative variable must be operationally defined, also a theoretical variable should be rigorously and objectively conceptually defined, so that researchers should be able to identify it in a univocal way without misunderstandings. Do not recognise conceptual differences implies serious conceptual confusions. Although authors from different theoretical background can use the same vocabulary, the same labels are often differently used to signify different phenomena. This imply that researchers don\u2019t debate the same phenomena, and what is more serious is that they are not conscious of it. For these reasons, in last years several developmental psychologists felt the need of a common scientific terminology. Surely, the lack of a common vocabulary constitutes a serious problem for psychology in general and for developmental psychology in particular. Without any agreement with definitions, the comparison between different psychological theories is hard and often impossible. According to Parisi (1996), a possible way to get round this problem consists in referring to the most rigorous and objective terminology used by neuroscientists. Nevertheless, in our opinion, this way of proceeding is restrictive and strongly depends on a particular epistemological approach not shared by all the psychologists. In fact, this approach suggests an epistemological, although not ontological, reductionism not accepted by every researcher in psychology. In other words, the problem is deeper in nature than simply using the same vocabulary. What often is not clear, is that using the same words is not sufficient to solve the problem of the incommunicability among theories. Instead, in our opinion, the main issue is to find an objective way to define conceptual variables intended to be described and explained. What we propose is that this theoretical impasse can be solved through two reasoning property largely studied by developmental psychologist: reversibility and decentralisation of thought. To clarify this point a brief digression about the scientific way of proceeding in acquiring knowledge on a given phenomenon is useful. An observable phenomenon can never be studied in its own complexity. For this reason, it becomes crucial for researcher to establish which aspect of reality he is interested to. In order to study a particular aspect of reality, every researcher must reduce phenomena in variables. A variable is defined as any measurable object\u2019s or event\u2019s propriety. By reducing a phenomenon in variables, scientist pays attention to some specific events, deciding to ignore all the others, although connected with it. It\u2019s plain that this choice is a fundamental step in research proceeding, because it determines the kind ok knowledge the research will obtain about a phenomenon. Usually, conceptual variables are chosen on the basis of researcher theoretical background. Different theoretical backgrounds stress different topics to be investigated in order to understand a given phenomenon. Conceptual variables must be transformed in operative variables, relative (related) to observable events. The degree of correspondence between conceptual and operative variables determines the validity of the operational definition construct. It\u2019s evident this validity runs out both when an inadequate measure as regards theoretical construct is used and when construct itself is wrong. In other words, when results found through particular measures are in contrast with the hypothetical correspondent conceptual variable, while other measures confirm it, if the error is due to theoretical construct or to operational definition of the conceptual variable is hardly detectable. On the other hand, discover the inadequacy of the operational definitions is probably simpler than demonstrating the conceptual variables are wrong. Different authors with different theoretical backgrounds often refer the adequacy of their own operational definitions claiming the inadequacy of operational definitions of other authors from antagonist theory. Nevertheless, it is, at the best hypotheses, a fruitless way of proceeding. What we wish is that every researcher, in front of contrasting findings by other authors, performs the peculiar action of reversible thought, that is de-operationalising operative variables and define, if possible, the conceptual variable according to his own theory. If the conceptual variable can de defined in such a way, the theory acquires power respect the antagonist theory, on the contrary one of the following logic conclusions has to be reached: 1) or both the theories are partially valid, that is a) they have adequately defined the phenomenon but two complementary aspects of it are detected, b) they have defined two different phenomena, so that each one are not able to describe and explain the aspect detected by the other theory. In any case, the effort should be building a theory able to define, interpret, describe, explain the two aspect of phenomena or the two phenomena. An implication of these way of proceeding is a researchers collaboration in define conceptual variables. It\u2019s not obvious that an accord will be reached, because the starting points of antagonist researchers are often in antinomy as regard mental structure and function. 2) Or both theories are wrong, that is they have non adequately defined the phenomenon. In this case, a researcher collaboration is wished to solve the discrepancy. 3) Or only one of the two theories is wrong not having adequately defined the phenomenon. Nevertheless, in this case it\u2019s not possible to decide which of two theories is right till the conceptual variable explained by one theory is not defined by the other. In all the three cases, it\u2019s indispensable every researcher studies the antagonist theory, changes his own point of view and understands phenomena it studies and it can describe and explain, wondering which utility it can have for theoretical and practical purposes. Over the time, this way of proceeding means to build a common conceptual language inside the psychology, avoiding the often useless academic discussions, in which everyone follows his own idea without consider, taking advantage, the numerous findings annually reached by the scientific-psychological community. Nevertheless, according to Lakatos (1970) the power of a theory or a research program should be firstly valued on the basis of the number of phenomena it is able to explain in a coherent and organised way, and only in a second time by the number of empirical researches it produces. Not proceeding in this way means to fragment psychology in a lot of disorganised and isolate sub-disciplines, that soon or later will confront each others to proceed to a unitary and complete knowledge of its own investigation object: Mind